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In this paper, we investigated whether civil wars in Africa have economic and
political causes. The model is based on the Collier-Hoeffler “greed” and “grievance”
theory in which rebels will conduct a civil war for “loot-seeking” and “justice-
seeking” reasons. Using logit models the propositions were tested empirically. In
particular, six variables, GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding period, the
amount of natural resources (proxied by primary commodity exports-GDP ratio),
peace duration, democracy, social fractionalisation, and population size are
significant and strong determinants of the onset of civil wars in Africa. The policy
implication is the combination of economic diversification, poverty and population
reduction, and political reforms so as to prevent conflict situations in African
countries.Résumé
Dans ce document, nous avons effectué des recherches pour déterminer si les
guerres civiles en Afrique ont des causes économiques et politiques. Le modèle
s’appuie sur la théorie Collier-Hoeffler de la « cupidité » et de « l’affliction »,
selon laquelle les rebelles s’engagent dans une guerre civile pour « piller » et « établir
la justice ». À l’aide de modèles logit, les propositions ont été testées de manière
empirique. Six variables, notamment,  le taux de croissance du PIB par habitant au
cours de la période précédente, la quantité de ressources naturelles (approximative
ajustée du ratio exportations de produits primaires/PIB), la durée de la paix, la
démocratie, le fractionnement social et le nombre d’habitants sont des facteurs
importants et très déterminants de la survenue des guerres civiles en Afrique. Au
plan politique, cela doit se traduire par une panoplie de mesures, notamment, la
diversification de l’économie, la réduction de la pauvreté et de la population et les
réformes politiques, en vue de prévenir les situations conflictuelles dans les pays
africains.*The author is a Principal Economist with the Development Research Department of the African Development Bank. He
is indebted to Maurice Kponnou who provided valuable research assistance.





Since the end of the Cold War, civil war has become the predominant form of violence globally
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000; de Soysa, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). For example,
of the 25 major armed conflicts listed by the Stocholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) in 2000, all except two were internal. Also, all of the 15 most deadly conflicts in 2001—
those that caused 100 or more deaths—were internal conflicts. Indeed, all but 3 of 57 major
armed conflicts registered for 1990–2001 were internal. Unfortunately, in SIPRI’s 2000 Yearbook,
it was stated that “…Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the World and the only region in
which the number of armed conflicts is on the increase” (SIPRI, 2000). Again, in its 2002 Yearbook,
SIPRI stated that “Africa continued to be the region with the greatest number of conflicts” (see
also Figure 1). These domestic conflicts pose a serious threat to economic development, especially
for these poor African countries. Empirical works have shown that conflicts can tear down levels
of economic development that took decades to achieve. Also, for a long time after their termination
the spin-offs of conflicts continue to limit economic growth (Collier 1998).
In this paper we apply the Collier-Hoefller model of conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 2000;
2001; 2002) as modified by Sorli (2002) to analyze the onset or outbreak of civil war in Africa as
a whole during the period, 1960-1999. Our main interest is to explore the impact of economic and
political variables on civil war outbreak in Africa and hence propose domestic and international
policies to effectively prevent civil wars in Africa.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theory of civil war onset
and outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our methodology and data. Section 4 presents
our findings. Section 5 concludes with some of the policy implications of our analysis.
II. The Theory of Civil War Outbreak
Collier (1998; 1999) and Collier and Hoeffler (1999a; b) distinguished between two possible
motives for civil war: “justice-seeking” and “loot-seeking”. In more recent papers, Collier and
Hoeffler (2000; 2001; 2002) have re-examined these motivations, referring to them as “greed”
and “grievance.”6 John C. Anyanwu
Greed is used here as a desire for private gain. It is argued that the existence of a “lootable”
resource base is both a motive for rebellion and a facilitating factor. Rebels have an incentive to
challenge governments because of private gain, which is a function of opportunities foregone by
engaging in violence and the availability of lootable income, which is the payoff for successfully
engaging in rebellion. But greed is explained by atypical opportunities, being one of the chief
conditions for profit-seeking, rebel organizations to exist. Collier and Hoeffler’s main proxy for
greed is the ratio of primary commodity exports to gross domestic product (GDP) and is seen as
offering the opportunity for extortion, which helps to finance war. Thus, they argue that the risk of
civil war initiation increases as the natural resource endowment increases and decreases as the
opportunity cost of rebellion increases. However, following Le Billon’s typology of natural resources
into geographical location (‘proximate” or ‘distant’ to capital) and the geographical concentration
(‘proximate’ or ‘diffuse’), Sorli (2002) considered Collier and Hoeffler’s use of primary commodity
dependence as lumpy. Sorli had therefore suggested and used (for the Middle East and North
Africa) a break down of primary commodity dependence into mineral and oil dependence. In
particular, it is argued that the unique technology, infrastructure and the dominant role of oil in the
international commodity market, in addition to its influence on economic and political development,
justifies this dichotomy. Our estimation with this dichotomy showed that the dichotomy was not
important for Africa hence they were dropped.
Figure 1: Panels of Mean War Onset by Five-
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Also, rebellions may occur when forgone income is unusually low and this can be proxied by mean
income per capita, male secondary schooling, and the growth rate of the economy in the preceding
period (representing new income opportunities). Collier and Hoeffler (2001) point to another
dimension of opportunity – weak government military capability. Thus, while forests and mountains
provide rebels with a safe haven, geographical dispersion of the population may inhibit government
capability (see also Herbst, 2000). Another source of rebel military opportunity is social cohesion
– ethnic and religious diversity within a country tends to reduce their ability to function. Thus, an
ethnically diverse society may reduce the opportunity for rebellion by limiting the recruitment pool.
This is usually measured by the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
Rebellions may also be caused by grievance and may aim at achieving justice. The demand versus
supply of justice determines the conditions for the onset of “justice-seeking” rebellions. The proxies
for the level of grievance include social (ethno-linguistic and religious) fractionalization, the degree
of political repression/democracy, ethnic dominance, and economic dysfunction (slow growth;
high inflation; high income or asset inequality). While social fractionalization and the presence of
minimum form of democracy could reduce the opportunity cost of rebellion, political repression
and economic dysfunction would decrease it. While Huntington (1991) asserts that political violence
is connected with democratization, it is posited that in regime transition processes, major change
is going on, and the ones who benefitted from the earlier situation always hold change back. Thus,
while transition brings about the hope for better times, this might not be delivered hence violence
is likely to occur (see Gurr, 1970).
III. Methodology and Data
For comparability, we follow the basic Collier-Hoefller studies with some variation discussed in
detail below. The objective is to assess the relative strengths of explanations holding constant
variables that proxy the competing explanations discussed above. We use a dependent variable
measuring civil war onset (“warsa”) set equal to 1 if a war was initiated during any 5-year period
and 0 if no war occurred. Civil war is defined as an internal war in which: “(a) military action was
involved, (b) the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as
measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides,
and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted” (Singer and Small, 1004). The data (1960-1999) on
161 countries are organized in five-year panels and are drawn from Sorli (2002) as a modification
of Collier and Hoeffler (2002). We made some small data improvements in this paper and to
estimate the probability of civil war onset, we used a pooled logit model. The variables are described
in appendix 1.
Hegre et al (2001) had emphasized the importance of political stability as well as the level of
democracy in the outbreak of civil war. In this study, therefore, we include variables on democracy
and transition. We used a variable measuring the lowest score of a composite measure of democracy
from Gates et al (2001), mainly capturing an objective measurement of political participation from
executive recruitment and executive constraint (Vanhanen, 1990). Transition is a dummy variable
taking the value one if a change in indicators result in a movement from one category to another in
the executive dimension; a change of at least two units in the constraints dimension; or a 100
percent increase or 50 percent decrease in the participation dimension. The creation or dissolution
of States is also defined as a polity change. Unlike Collier and Hoeffler our model patterns to the8 John C. Anyanwu
whole of the African continent (North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) rather than theirs, which
was limited to Sub-saharan Africa.
The basic model is Pr(WARSA1960-1999)=f(E, D, P, R, S, A), where E denotes economic variables
(GDP per capita and GDP growth rate), D denotes demographic variables (population size and
geographic dispersion), P denotes political variables (peace duration, minimum democracy and its
squared term, and transition), R denotes resources (primary commodity exports to GDP ratio and
its squared term), S denotes socio-cultural variables (proxied by social fractionalization and ethnic
dominance), and A denotes Sub-Saharan Africa. The North African dummy dropped due to
insufficient data points. We note that resources could also be classified as economic variables as
in Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002).
 Based on the above specification, we test three key hypotheses:
H1: Economic development (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, primary commodity exports-
GDP ratio and its squared term) is significantly and negatively associated with civil war onset in
Africa These empirical measures reflect both the opportunity costs of violence (Collier and Hoeffler
2000) and the relative strength of the state (Fearon and Laitin, 2001).
H2: Democracy should reduce the onset of civil war in Africa. This hypothesis is contrary to
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2000, 2001, 2002) results. We also consider political transition as a
proximate cause of civil war.
H3: Ethnic fractionalization should be significantly associated with civil war onset in Africa. Both
high and low levels of fractionalization should reduce the onset of civil war by making it harder to
coordinate the initiation of new wars. We also consider ethnic dominance as another proximate
cause of civil war in Africa.
IV. Empirical Results and Tests of our Hypotheses
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for Africa for the period, 1960-1999, showing also war
episodes (civil war outbreak) and peace episodes (no civil war). Out of the 78 war outbreaks
during the period, 40 (or 51.28 percent) occurred in Africa. As the table shows, the African
conflict episodes started at approximately the mean income of the continent but slightly less than
the mean income of the peace episodes. With respect to the second economic variable - the
growth rate of the economy in the preceding period – we discover that war episodes were preceded
by lower growth rates. This result is consistent with evidence that the lower is the rate of growth,
the higher is the probability of unconstitutional political change (Alesina et al, 1996). The descriptive
statistics also give support to the opportunity cost hypothesis: conflict episodes were on average
more dependent upon primary commodity exports (and its squared term) than the peace episodes.
This indicates that increases in war outbreak were partly due to rebel responses to financial
opportunities in Africa contrary to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2001, 2002).
As predicted by theory, the descriptive data support the thesis that peace duration reduces grievance
and war episodes. Also, data supports the thesis that democracy reduces the probability of warEconomic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results 9
outbreak: minimum democracy (and its squared term) was substantially larger (almost double) in
peace episodes. In the same way, transition was larger in peace episodes. However, the descriptive
data suggests that social fractionalization is important: war episodes have higher mean values. This
rejects the thesis that social cohesion enhances opportunity. On the other hand, ethnic dominance
is more common in peace episodes than in war episodes.
With respect to demographic variables, the descriptive data shows that war episodes in Africa
had markedly larger populations than the peace episodes. Table 1 indicates that the concentration
of the population is as common in peace episodes as in war episodes. Sub-saharan Africa is prone
to civil war (0.39) than to peace episodes (0.28) (Table 1).
4.2 Regression Results and Tests of Hypotheses
Our estimation results are presented in table 2, with column 1 as our baseline result. We first turn
to the economic variables. The risk of onset of civil war is positively but non-significantly associated
with per capita income. This partly fails to lend support to the Collier-Hoeffler economic theory of
civil war. However, the other proxy for earnings foregone – economic growth rate in the preceding
period – is robustly and negatively associated with war onset in Africa. An additional percentage
point on the growth rate reduces the risk of war by about two percentage points.
As in Sorli (2002) and Collier-Hoeffler (2000, 2001, 2002) we find that the presence of natural
resources (proxied by primary exports-GDP ratio) seems to provide easily “lootable” assets for
“loot-seeking” rebels or convenient sources of support of “justice-seeking” movements as exposed
by Collier (1999). Thus, while we accept the hypothesis that economic development is significantly
associated with the onset of civil war in Africa, we note that higher economic growth significantly
reduces civil war while dependence on, or the availability of, natural resources increases the risk
of war onset in the Continent. We note also that it is not the level of per capita income per se that
leads to war outbreak in Africa.
Democracy is clearly significant and negatively associated with civil war onset in Africa. This
supports the findings of Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Ellingsen et al (2001), and Sorli (2002)
but contradicts the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2002). In our results, democracy shows to be
an important explanatory variable, and yields strength to a more
traditional “grievance-based” and liberal peace-rooted explanation of civil war. Thus, we accept
the hypothesis that democracy reduces the onset of civil war in Africa. Also, in accordance with
political theory, peace duration is significantly and negatively associated with civil war in Africa. In
addition, social fractionalization significantly reduces the risk of civil war outbreak. This means
that cohesion is important for rebel effectiveness hence social fractionalization makes a society
substantially safer. This accords with the reality in Africa, which is characterized by high degree of
religious and ethnic fractionalization. Thus, we accept the hypothesis that ethnic fractionalization is
significantly and negatively associated with civil war onset in Africa. The non-significance of the
positive association between ethnic dominance and civil war in Africa arises because fewer African
societies are characterized by ethnic dominance.10 John C. Anyanwu
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Africa
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No civil war Civil war
(N=334) (N=40)
War starts 382 .1047 .3066 0 1 0 1
Natural log of GDP per capita
(const. US$) 399 6.9292 .6989 5.4027 8.8877 6.945 6.919
GDP per capita growth t-1 347 .6289 3.7491 -10.664 13.189 .869 -1.526
Primary commodity
exports/GDP 403 .1699 .1345 .006 .568 .171 .188
Primary commodity
exports/GDP squared 403 .0469 .0720 .000036 .3226 .048 .0512
Peace duration 382 301.356 169.2954 1 592 314.585 188.25
Minimum democracy 324 .4188 .5133 0 1.6560 .440 .240
Minimum democracy squared 324 .4381 .7843 0 2.7424 .463 .280
Transition 416 .3534 .4786 0 1 .351 .325
Social fractionalization 416 2946.267 2166.493 20 6975 2901.003 2960.875
Ethnic dominance (45-90%) 416 .4231 .4946 0 1 .412 .350
Natural log of population 412 15.3023 1.5169 10.6383 18.5275 15.114 16.089
Geographical dispersion 408 .5866 .1921 0 .923 .5836 .5838
Sub-saharan African dummy 416 .8462 .3612 0 1 .278 .385
Africa dummy 416 1 0 1 1 1 1
The coefficient of the size of the population is highly significant, positively associated with civil
war, and unity. This suggests that risk is proportional to size. We also find that the Sub-saharan
African dummy coefficient is significant only at 15 percent significance level and positively associated
with civil war. While this may suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa is subject to some minor unobserved
additional or reduced risk factors, it is nevertheless consistent with the finding of “no Africa effect”
by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Sorli (2002), though the coefficient from the former was
negative when the entire sample was used. This suggests that the global estimation might be masking
sub-region African pictures found by Collier-Hoeffler and Sorli.
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications
We have investigated whether civil wars in Africa have economic and political causes. The model
used is based on the Collier-Hoeffler “greed” and “grievance” theory in which rebels will conduct
a civil war for “loot-seeking” and “justice-seeking” reasons. Using logit models the propositions
were tested empirically. In particular, six variables, GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding
period, the amount of natural resources (proxied by primary commodity exports-GDP ratio),
peace duration, democracy, social fractionalization, and population size are significant and strong
determinants of the onset of civil wars in Africa.
These results are guideposts for policy to reduce civil war onset in Africa. First, African countries
and their development partners need to take measures to accelerate economic growth given that
rapid economic growth will gradually make rebel recruitment harder. However, given that such
high growth rates cannot be realized without external assistance, it is imperative that Africa’s
development partners and the international community as a whole need to increase aid to theEconomic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results 11
Table 2: Regression Results of the Onset of Civil war in Africa+
Explanatory Variable Model 1 - Model 2 Model 3
(Baseline)
Natural log of GDP per
capita (const. US$) .301 .242
(.694) (.701)
GDP per capita growth t-1 -.159 -.159 -.154
(.073)** (.074)** (.074)**
Primary commodity 6.088 5.487 12.006
exports/GDP (2.345)** (2.724)* (8.867)
Primary commodity -12.220
exports/GDP squared (15.895)
Peace duration -.004 -.004 -.003
(.002)** (.002)** (.002)**
Minimum democracy -5.863 -5.923 -5.764
(2.150)*** (2.155)*** (2.166)***
Minimum democracy 3.904 3.910 3.796
squared (1.463)*** (1.462)*** (1.635)***
Transition .825 .811 .849
(.588) (.589) (.598)
Social fractionalization -.0004 -.0004 -.0005
(.0002)** (.0002)** (.0002)**
Ethnic dominance .716 .697 .673
(45-90%) (.605) (.610) (.619)
Natural log of 1.053 1.059 1.058
population (.365)*** (.366)*** (.371)***
Geographical dispersion .344 .526 .194
(1.611) (1.658) (1.732)
Sub-saharan African 1.894 2.308 2.220
dummy (1.183) (1.525) (1.521)**
Constant -19.899 -22.360 -22.282
(6.507)*** (8.726)*** (8.737)***
N 253 253 253
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.25 0.25
Log Likelihood -52.77 -52.67 -52.36
Notes: + Standard errors in parentheses;  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level,
respectively.12 John C. Anyanwu
Continent. This is more so when it has been shown that aid is effective in accelerating economic
growth. Second, the international community should take measures (including appropriate sanctions)
to make it more difficult for rebel organizations to sell the commodities (such as conflict diamonds),
which they loot. Third, African countries need to diversify their economies away from dependence
upon primary commodity exports. Appropriate economic reforms and policies would therefore be
imperative in this direction (see Collier, 2000). Fourth, to make loot-seeking rebels unpopular,
African governments should transparently use revenues from primary commodity exports to finance
effective basic social services, including education and health.
However, economic development must be complemented by political development and liberalization
to attain an amplified effect. The pace of political reforms toward better governance and improved
political rights should be accelerated in Africa given that our results have shown that democracy is
a useful tool to reduce the onset of civil war in the Continent. African countries may also need to
check population increase through a combination of economic and social as well as medical tools
given the finding that the risk of civil war is proportional to the size of the population.Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results 13
APPENDIX 1
Description of variables
“The data source for all variables used in this paper is Sørli (2002), being a modification of Collier and
Hoeffler (2002). It provides a panel data set for 161 countries and eight time periods, 1960-64, 1965-
70, ..., 1995-99. Thus, it provides 1288 potential observations.
War starts
The war start variable takes a value of one if a civil war started during the period and zero if the country
is at peace. If a war started in period t and continues in t+1 we record the value of the war started
value as missing. A civil war is defined as an internal conflict in which at least 1000 battle related
deaths (civilian and military) occurred per year. We use mainly the data collected by Singer and
Small (1984, 1994) and according to their definitions Nicholas Sambanis updated their data set for
1992-99.
GDP per capita
We measure income as real PPP adjusted GDP per capita. The primary data set is the Penn World
Tables 5.6 (Summers and Heston 1991). Since the data is only available from 1960-92 we used the
growth rates of real PPP adjusted GDP per capita data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators 1998 in order to obtain income data for 1995. Income data is measured at the beginning of
each sub-period, 1965, 1970, ..., 1995.
(GDP growth)t-1
Using the above income per capita measure we calculated the average annual growth rate as a proxy
of economic opportunities. This variable is measured in the previous five-year period.
Primary commodity exports/GDP
The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP proxies the abundance of natural resources. The data
on primary commodity exports as well as GDP was obtained from the World Bank. Export and GDP
data are measured in current US dollars. The data is measured at the beginning of each sub-period,
1965, 1970, ...,1995.
Population
Population measures the total population; the data source is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators 1998. Again, we measure population a the beginning of each sub-period.
Social fractionalization
We proxy social fractionalization in a combined measure of ethnic and religious fractionalization.
Ethnic fractionalization is measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index. It measures the
probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same language.
Data is only available for 1960. In the economics literature this  measure was first used by Mauro
(1995). Using data from Barrett (1982) on religious affiliations we constructed an analogous religious
fractionalization index. Following Barro (1997) we aggregated the various religious affiliations into
nine categories: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, Eastern Religions (other than
Buddhist), Indigenous Religions and no religious affiliation. Data is available for 1970 and 1980 and
the values are very similar. For 1960, 1965 and 1970 we used the 1970 data and for 1980, 1985, 1990
and 1995 we use the 1980 data. For 1975 we use the average of the 1970 and 1980 data.
The fractionalization indices range from zero to 100. A value of zero indicates that the society is
completely homogenous whereas a value of 100 would characterize a completely heterogeneous
society.
We calculated our social fractionalization index as the product of the ethnolinguistic fractionalization
and the religious fractionalization index plus the ethnolinguistic or the religious fractionalization index,
whichever is the greater. By adding either index we avoid classifying a country as homogenous (a14 John C. Anyanwu
value of zero) if the country is ethnically homogenous but religiously divers, or vice versa. Evidence
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2000) shows that this aggregation rule is superior to variants.
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)
Using the ethno-linguistic data from the original data source (Atlas Naradov
Mira, 1964) we calculated an indicator of ethnic dominance. This variable takes the value of one if one
single ethno-linguistic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the total population and zero otherwise.
Geographic Dispersion
We constructed a dispersion index of the population on a country-by-country basis. Based on population
data for 400km2 cells we generated a Gini coefficient of population dispersion for each country. A
value of 0 indicates that the population is evenly distributed across the country and a value of 1
indicates that the total population is concentrated in one area. Data is available for 1990 and 1995.
For years prior to 1990 we used the 1990 data.
Peace Duration
This variable measures the length of the peace period since the end of the previous civil war. For
countries, which never experienced a civil war, we measure the peace period since the end of World
War II until 1962 (172 months) and add 60 peace months in each consecutive five-year period.
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy
Takes the value of one for the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Collier & Hoeffler, 2002: 27-30; and Sørli, 2002:
27-29).
Variables added by Sørli (2002) that are relevant to our analysis:
Minimum democracy and transition
Variables are taken from the data set from Gates et al., 2001”.
African Countries in Our Data Set:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some Econometric Results 15
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